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Memorandum

27 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator

SUBJECT : Preparations for NSC Meeting and Presidential Briefings

1. Attached are more materials related to an NSC meeting on Africa (which is still scheduled for Monday, but we hear rumors that it might slip). Included are materials Mr. Carlucci used briefing the President on 26 September which you will want to review for background. There is also some new material from NIO/AF.

2. You have several packages on possible briefing topics for 3 October. The following comments are pertinent.

A. Panamanian Foreign Policy. Dr. Brzezinski suggested and the President concurred during Mr. Carlucci's briefing that an early briefing would be in order. I believe "early" should be interpreted as "3 October unless we simply can't make it." [redacted] has prepared material to allow you to begin to think about this. 25X1A

B. [redacted] Dr. Perry is scheduled to testify before Senator Jackson's Committee the morning of 3 October. He'll be out of the country 10 October. I have told his office not to try to change his schedule for now. 25X1A

C. [redacted]

3. Also included here two briefing topics you may want to review for future briefings.

A. Soviet Command & Control.

B. Latin American Trends. You noted before that you had not been able to focus on NIO/LA's proposal. It is submitted here with some backup material so you can see if you agree with the proposed thrust. 25X1

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4. Finally I have attached the results of my reading on allied landings in Norway in World War II in response to your question after your meeting with SECDEF.




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Attachments

cc: DD/NFA

ALLIED LANDINGS IN NORWAY



Although the official United Kingdom history of the Second World War and Norwegian histories are not explicit about each case, the following is clear concerning allied landings in Norway in World War II.

--Apart from putting guerrillas or agents ashore, all allied landings in Norway took place in April-May 1940.

--Of these landings several were made at small ports and a few on beaches near Narvik and Trondheim.

--All of them were unopposed administrative landings, e.g. General Mackery hid his soldiers between decks when his transport moored on 14 April at Harstad, a small port near Narvik, until he ascertained that the natives were friendly.

The Allies could land light infantry at will in fishing villages, but in the end their hold on the sea was too tenuous to allow bringing in heavy artillery or establishing effective aerodromes. So after weeks of heavy pressure ashore; periodic air, surface and subsurface attacks at sea; and finally disaster in France (read "Central Region") the Royal Navy evacuated the English, Canadian, French, Polish and Norwegian troops who were fighting around Narvik and Trondheim.

There are similarities between the 1940 Norwegian campaign and what might develop on NATO's northern flank. Geographically the campaigns are mirror images; the Germans came from the south, the Russians would come from the north. German land-based aircraft had clear air superiority over Norway; the Russians would too. In 1940 the Royal Navy was strong enough in adjacent seas to grasp local control of the air over coastal towns for a few hours at a time, but never could operate with impunity in the Norwegian Sea; this is the best NATO navies can expect.

The following freely-rendered "quotations" are drawn from Andenas, Riste & Skodvin's, Norway and the Second World War, Oslo, 1966.

"...in the Seekriegsleitung (Naval War Staff) on 3 October [1939], Raeder brought up for discussion the topic of naval bases in Norway and it was decided...that Raeder should inform Hitler of the considerations of the navy... A few days after the discussion in the Naval War Staff the German submarine chief, Admiral Döenitz, submitted a memorandum on the issue from the viewpoint of submarine

warfare. After enumerating the three prerequisites...an ice-free port, accessible by rail and situated outside the narrow passage between Norway and the Shetlands, he limited the choice to Narvik and Trondheim... Raeder...took the opportunity of putting the issue to Hitler at a conference on naval affairs on 10 October... Since it is known that Hitler was fully aware of the importance of submarine warfare from forward bases in the case of a prolonged war, his lack of interest in Raeder's suggestion indicates that his mind at this stage was occupied with the idea of a short war based on a rapid offensive in the west. (pp. 29-31)

"Actually increasingly reliable reports of a major breakout of the German navy had reached London already on 6 and 7 April [1940]. But the Admiralty, apparently exclusively worried about possible threats to their Atlantic supply lines, allowed their ships at sea to proceed on a course which in effect prevented all but chance encounters with the German invasion fleet [bound for Norway]...the surprise effect of the German assault was achieved, (pp. 48-49)."